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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Natasha

Lynn

Bly appeals from the judgment entered

upon her

conditional guilty plea to possession of a controlled substance, claiming the
district court erred in denying her motion to suppress.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Detective Benson was in an area of Nampa with "an epidemic amount of
drug activity."

(Tr., p.8, Ls.18-25.)

Olmos at the Super 8 Motel.

He located a vehicle registered to a Richard

(Tr., p.9, Ls.8-14.)

Olmos had an active arrest

warrant for "drug-related activity." (Id.) Although unsuccessful in locating Olmos
in or around the motel, Detective Benson did observe a vehicle approach the
motel with its occupants engaged in activity consistent with a "drug transaction."
(Tr., p.9, L.16- p.10, L.14.)
The detective also observed Bly leave the motel, come out to Olmos'
vehicle and "exhibit[ ] some strange or suspicious activity getting in and out of
the car several times." (Tr., p.10, Ls.17-21.) Bly then got into Olmos' car and
drove it across the motel parking lot.

(Tr., p.10, Ls.21-25.) After moving the

vehicle, Bly went back into the motel and then came "immediately back out" and
headed towards Olmos' vehicle.

(Tr., p.11, Ls.3-13.)

At that point, Detective

Benson made contact with Bly, telling her to "hold on a minute." (Tr., p.13, Ls.710.)
Detective Benson asked Bly for her information, at which time he "could
smell the distinct odor of burnt marijuana coming from her person." (Tr., p.13,
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.)

had

also observed that Bly's speech was "a bit slurred"
eyes," as

marijuana

as heat

, p.14, Ls.5-20.)

on her tongue consistent
Detective Benson asked Bly about the car she

had driven across the parking lot and she indicated it belong to a man named
Richard who had picked her up and brought her to the motel.

(Tr., p.15, Ls.16-

25.)
Detective Benson then physically detained Bly and did a preliminary
search for weapons, at which time "it came to our understanding that she had
some items [of drugs] on her." (Tr., p.17, Ls.11-19.) A female officer ultimately
conducted

a

more

thorough

search

of

Bly's

person

and

found

methamphetamine. (Tr., p.17, Ls.11-21.)
The state charged Bly with possession of a controlled substance.

(R.,

pp.16-17.) Bly subsequently moved to exclude all evidence found based on her
claim that the police had insufficient cause to detain and ultimately search her
person.

(R., pp.19-20.) The court agreed that Bly was in fact detained by law

enforcement, but ruled that such detention was justified.

(Tr., p.43, L.22 - p.47,

L.5.)
Bly entered a conditional plea of guilty to possession of a controlled
substance, reserving her right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress.
(R., pp.42-57.) The court sentenced Bly to a unified three-year sentence with the
first year fixed and placed Bly on a two-year period of supervised probation. (R.,
pp.70-72.) Bly timely appealed. (R., pp.63-64, 86-87.)
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ISSUE

the

on appeal as:

Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Bly's motion to
suppress?
(Appellant's brief, p.5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Bly failed to show that the district court erred
suppression motion?
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in

denying her

ARGUMENT
Bly Has Failed To Establish The District Court Erred In Denying Her Suppression
Motion

A

Introduction
Bly challenges the denial of her suppression motion, arguing as she did

below that her detention "was not supported by reasonable,
suspicion."

(Appellant's brief, p.8.)

Bly's argument fails.

articulable

The district court

correctly applied the law to the facts in concluding she was lawfully detained
pursuant reasonable suspicion based on the totality of the circumstances that
criminal activity was afoot.

B.

Standard Of Review
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers

to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards
have been satisfied in light of the facts.

State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810,

203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009); State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655,658, 152 P.3d 16,
19 (2007).

C.

The District Court Correctly Applied The Law To The Facts In Concluding
Bly's Detention Was Based On A Reasonable Suspicion That Criminal
Activity Was Afoot
Seizures of the person are evaluated under a Fourth Amendment

standard of reasonableness.

Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 697-700

(1981 ). Generally, any seizure of a person, whether by arrest or detention, must
be supported by probable cause.

Ji:L

at 700; Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
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200, 208 (1979). There are, however, certain exceptions to the probable cause
requirement.

example, it is well-settled that a police officer

in

compliance with the Fourth Amendment, make an investigatory stop of an
individual if that officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is
underway. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). "An investigative detention
is permissible if it is based upon specific articulable facts which justify suspicion
that the detained person is, has been, or is about to be engaged in criminal
activity." State v. Sheldon, 139 Idaho 980, 983, 88 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App.
2003) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417
(1981)).
Bly argues that she could not be detained "simply because she was in the
area where drug activity [was] suspected" or "simply because Detective Benson
might have suspected that she knew Mr. Olmos because there is no criminal
activity." (Appellant's brief, p.9.) Bly further argues that her detention was based
on

the

detective's

"suspicion" which

unsupported by evidence." (Id.)

was

"simply a series

of hunches

For these reasons, Bly argues, her detention

was "illegal because it was not supported by reasonable articulable suspicion
that criminal activity was afoot" and, as such, "[t]he fruits of the search ... that
followed the illegal detention must therefore be suppressed." (Appellant's brief,
pp.8-9.) Bly's arguments fail.
In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the Court must
consider the officer's training and experience and the reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from the facts available to the officer. See United States v. Cortez,
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449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) ("[A] trained officer draws inferences
deductions - inferences and deductions that might well elude an untrained
person ... [T]he evidence ... must be seen and weighed not in terms of library
analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law
enforcement."); State v. Roe, 140 Idaho 176, 180, 90 P.3d 926, 930 (Ct. App.
2004) ("An officer may draw reasonable inferences from the facts in his or her
possession, and those inferences may be drawn from the officer's experience
and law enforcement training."); State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613, 798 P .2d
453, 458 (Ct. App. 1990) ("An officer's training and experience often play a role
in pinpointing facts and circumstances that give rise to reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity afoot.").
Here, the investigating detective did not simply have a hunch that this was
an area with high drug activity or that Bly might be acquainted with someone who
had an active arrest warrant.

As the district court correctly concluded, the

totality of the circumstances known to Detective Benson - including the history of
the area itself, the activity taking place in and around the area, and Bly's
connection to the vehicle registered to a suspect wanted for drug activity provided the officer, who was trained in drug interdiction (Tr., p.7, Ls.2-16), with
reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was afoot:
The issue then becomes as to whether or not this met the
standards for an appropriate Terry stop. In Terry, the United States
Supreme Court indicated, quote, "A police officer may stop or
temporarily detain an individual for investigative purposes so long
as the officer is aware of facts which allow him to reasonable
conclude in light of his or her experience that criminal activity may
be afoot." And Terry was recognized in State of Idaho versus
Babb, a court of appeals [sic] case in Idaho in 2000.
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To justify a Terry stop, the officer has to cite facts which lead
to a reasonable articulable suspicion that crime may be afoot. The
officer testified that they'd received evidence of drug trafficking
the area of the Super 8 Motel. He testified that he saw a green
sedan registered to Richard Olmos in the parking lot of the hotel.
He had a legitimate right to look at the vehicles, to run checks on
the vehicle license plates in the hotel. Upon doing that, he found
that Mr. Olmos was the registered owner of that and he had a drugrelated warrant.
He also saw three women in a vehicle that came, went
inside the hotel, came out a short time later and left. That could
have been innocent contact or conduct, but it also adds up to a
reasonable suspicion that perhaps drug transactions were taking
place under the officer's training and experience.

I think he had a right to contact the defendant who was
driving Mr. Olmos' vehicle, went in and looked into Mr. Olmos'
vehicle and looked around and then went back in the hotel, came
out later and - or actually moved the vehicle about 50 feet and
came back later.
I think that the officer had a reasonable suspicion that Mr.
Olmos may have been in the area.
And I think he had a
reasonable basis for questioning the person that was involved,
clearly involved with Mr. Olmos' vehicle to try to contact him.
(Tr., p.44, L.15- p.46, L.6.)
The court correctly viewed the facts known to the officer in their totality
and in light of the officer's training and experience in determining the officer had
reasonable suspicion to believe there was unlawful drug activity occurring in and
around the Super 8 Motel as well as Bly's potential knowledge of a wanted
suspect's whereabouts and as such, briefly detained Bly to determine whether or
not she was involved in it drug activity or had information of criminal activity.
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CONCLUSION
state respectfully requests that this Court

district cou

order denying Bly's motion to suppress.
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